Marshall 24, Ohio 23: Your [Insensitive Cardiac Arrest Joke] Finish Of The Day
This was an entirely s l o w game leading up to the third quarter, but the finish was glorious. Although not an OHIO-friendly finish.
Boo Jackson and the Bobcats (which is one of my favorite R&B combos ... you absolutely must see them live sometime) had 61 seconds, zero timeouts, and 72 yards to go to score seven points. They got the touchdown — on a Hail Mary-ish heave — from the 36-yard line to Terrence McCrae.
However...
Instead of trudging through an overtime game, Bobcats coach Frank Solich kept the offense out there. A two-point conversion to win — what gall. Jackson found Riley Dunlop WIDE open in the end-zone (the closest person to him was probably the security guard, or the goalpost) but Dunlop's legs sadly misstepped and he fell just as Jackson was throwing it to him.
Heartbreaking, especially for the Bobcats. Was it the right call? Do you give your team a better chance to win in overtime, or was OHIO undermatched and this was their best chance?
My initial reaction is, well, of course it was a great chance. Dunlop keeps his footing, and the Bobcats probably walk away with their first win over the Herd in six meetings (their last time was in 2000). Second-guessing the coach is America's favorite pastime, and I'm sure you'll have a fair number of arguments which say that both teams were panting after 60 minutes and Ohio looked mighty fresh in that final drive. Big Boo was finding open men, scrambling for first downs, and could've kept scoring TDs in extra frames. And the defense had a clutch four-and-out to get the ball for that final drive.
But Alas. No matter the conclusion, OHIO is a crestfallen 1-3.
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Dogs always go for the win
period. it’s mathematics. if you go for the tie you are handing the edge back to the house.
it’s like in craps. you put a bet on the pass line. the point is set at six. then you put a bet on the big six.
Instead, you should take the odds on your pass line bet, and instead of getting 1:1 on the six you get 6:5 which are the actual odds of the point hitting.
Kicking a PAT gives the house back the edge. When you’re a dog, you take the opportunity to win when it presents itself. Every economic study on the issue comes to this same conclusion.
The only reason you would deviate from optimal strategy was if there was an external value that somehow superceded the value of the game. .Like if face were worth a significant value more and so taking the suboptimal strategy would cost you the game, but save you face in the bigger game. But I cannot fathom any situation in which that would apply.
Let's consider the numbers on that call.
Coming into this game, Ohio was 83% (5 of 6) this season on PAT kicks. Coming into that situation, they were 87% (7 of 8). In 2009, they were 89%. This was their first 2-point conversion of 2010; in 2009 they were 60% (3 of 5). A quick search didn’t turn up stats on OTs, but even if you assume a toss-up (50%), that only gives them a 43.5% chance of winning (make the kick, then win in OT) compared to 60% (make the conversion, celebrate now). For it to be a toss-up between the kick and the conversion, you’d have to assume a 70% chance of winning in OT.
those aren't meaningful numbers
you can’t draw a projected outcome from such a small sample. eventually your team will return to the mean. a 2PAT does not fundamentally change the advantages-disadvantages at any position vis-a-vis the opponent because there is a finite number of possible play choices from that position. .
but it doesn’t. .in the end, mattter what those averages are. because they are just going to be further diminished by the overall underdog disadvantage once the iteration begins round two, overtime. in other words, you are placed in the one position in a football game in which you get the “real odds” — success in a 2PAT isn’t really worth 2 but infinity, because you ended the game.
if you take the PAT you cede control of the topdog advantage back to the favorite — remember that just to be in the position of being able to be tied you overcame the odds against you. now you’re starting over with a new game with those same odds (divided by the as-yet-undecided percentage of a full game an overtime period constitutes) and added on. or, in the end, subtracted.
for the sake of simplicity, let’s take the AFL grand final friday night. I dont’ know that the real odds were. but collingswood was heavily favored. probably close to 2/3 probability. .meaning st kilda had a 2/3 probability of losing. they managed to tie, and in the grand final of the australian football league if there’s a draw the match is replayed a week later.
so by avoiding a loss, st kilda beat 2/3 odds of losing. now they play another game with identical rosters, no significant injuries, same coaches, same stadium. .the likelihood of collingswood winning is again 2/3 for this iteration and 2/3 that st kilda will lose.
but what are st kilda’s odds for not losing the AFL Championship? They’re actually 8/9. .(given the possibility of a draw, we can’t quite say their chances of winning the championship in this came are 1/9, but it’s very close.(
because they already beat significant odds to not lose the first game. .with each iteration of a game, the probabilities shrink (for the underdog) exponentially. .because you’ve managed to make the unlikely event happen each time. .
(the monte hall paradox works on the same principle.)
so say a st kilde player has the option to handpass a ball through the goal, which is a behind worth 1 point which would tie the game and force a draw. or he can try a risky maneuver to spin around and kick the ball through the goal, which is a 6-point championship winning goal. however, he has a 60% chance of being tackled and ending the game.in a loss. .he has a 100% chance of getting the draw with the hand pass. .what should he do?
he should go for the 40% chance of the goal every time. .because those are far better odds than 1/9. .in fact if he had a 20% chance of making the goal, he should still do it. the payoff is infinity. .
for our example, you would have to divide the second iteration probabilities by whatever divisor of a full game we decide an overtime period constitutes. .then add that to the probability of losing the game in its full time. .
by this same math, you can see that UAB’s coach erred in kicking a Field Goal at the end of OT 1 against Tennessee. I don’t know what the odds of UAB losing to tennessee was — probabily similar to ohio’s versus marshall. .by kicking a game-tying field goal to force an OT 2, they’ve managed to beat the odds AGAIN and force yet another exponential reduction in their odds to not lose the game.
(of course, we’d multiple the odds by the percentage of a game we deem an overtime to be for that, too. if st kilda manages to tie collingswood again this coming friday, they’ll have a lovely 88/89 chance of losing Championship (assuming rosters coaching etc stay the same)
I don't follow your numbers
but I think in the end, we’re both making the same point.
Given the situation, the probability of winning is greater if you go for the immediate win. Probability of a successful 2-point conversion > probability of a successful PAT and then winning the OT.

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